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I. INTRODUCTION
The prevailing judicial interpretation of disgorgement is
unduly limited, consequently impairing the effectiveness of the
anti-fraud provisions of federal securities laws. Typically, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter Commission) seeks
disgorgement in cases involving stock manipulation and other
violations of anti-fraud provisions. In ordering disgorgement,
practically all courts have required defendants to return only
profits actually received as a result of their fraud, rather than
requiring the violators to make the defrauded investors whole.'
Unfortunately, limiting the remedy of disgorgement to profits
actually received by the securities law violator, might potentially
encourage fraud. Under a simplified cost benefit analysis, the
prospect of merely returning what one has unlawfully received does
not outweigh the benefit of committing the fraud. Obviously, there
are a plethora of other relevant considerations, but in sum they do
not serve as a disincentive to engage in securities fraud.2 Only
* Scott L. Warfman is currently associated with the firm of Zack, Hanzman,
Ponce & Tucker, P.A., and practices commercial litigation with an emphasis on
securities law.
1. see, e.g., securities and Exchange Commission V. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325,
1335 (5th Cir. 1978)("Disgorgement extends only to the amount with interest by
which the defendant profited from his wrongdoing.").
2. Historically, the remedies available to the commission have largely been
inadequate to prevent securities fraud. "The Commission has found that to resort
to civil injunction and administrative proceeding, no matter how vigorously
employed, is not completely effective in halting the operation of boiler rooms."
25 S.E.C. Ann. Rep. 3 (1959), quoted in John D. Ellsworth, Disgorgement in
Securities Fraud Actions Brought by the SEC, 3 DuKE L.J. 641, 647 n.41 (1977)
(hereinafter Disgorgement in SEC Actions].
a fraction of securities laws violators are prosecuted by the
Department of Justice or state authorities, thereby leaving the
Commission with the primary responsibility of enforcing the federal
securities laws.3 Considering that the remedy of disgorgement was
judicially created to effectuate the remedial purposes of the
securities laws and deter fraud, a limited interpretation of
disgorgement may unfortunately, have the opposite effect.
Disgorgement should not be limited to simply returning what
one has unlawfully received, but should be expanded to at least
restore the parties to their former positions, in other words
specific restitution. "Since disgorgement is an equitable
doctrine, there is no limit to the various forms and kinds of
specific remedies which (the Chancellor] may grant.",4 This article
takes the position that the remedy of disgorgement should empower
a court to compel a primary violator to disgorge all profits plus
all other monies fraudulently obtained from investors so long as
there is a causal link between investors, losses and the illegal
conduct. Implemented in this manner, victims of manipulated
securities transactions may be made whole. Each wrongdoer would be
individually responsible for all of the investors, losses
regardless of the amounts received by each wrongdoer. This
interpretation of disgorgement would provide a more powerful
disincentive to violate the securities laws. Not only would
manipulating the price of stock become unprofitable, it would
become more costly to engage in.
In order for jurists to adopt an expanded interpretation of
disgorgement, they will have to employ a perspective different from
that generally reflected in the reported cases. Historically, the
focus of a disgorgement calculation is the benefit which inures to
the wrongdoer. Defining disgorgement to include specific
restitution would focus on the harm suffered by the defrauded
investors, rather than on the illegal profits garnered by the
securities laws violators. This perspective complements the
remedial nature of the securities laws. Making reparations to
A similar sentiment was expressed by Joseph I. Goldstein in recent
testimony before the House subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance,
wherein Goldstein pointed out that penny stock manipulations are often not
deterred by the civil remedies available to the Commission, and therefore, the
agency has actively sought to enlist the help of criminal prosecutors. Penny
Stock Market Fraud, 1989: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1989) (testimony of Joseph
I. Goldstein, Director of the Commissions Division of Enforcement).
3. In fiscal year 1989, the Commission instituted 155 administrative
proceedings and filed 140 civil actions based on violations of the federal
securities laws. During this period, the commission granted access to its files
to federal and state prosecutorial authorities in 226 cases. However, only
approximately 76 criminal indictments or information and 72 convictions were
obtained by criminal authorities in commission-related cases. 55 S.E.C. Ann.
Rep. 1 (1989).
4. 3 JOHN Po1EROY, EQUITY JufISPRDEuCE S 109 at 141 (5th ed. 1941).
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defrauded investors will undo the wrong, and thus facilitate the
purpose of an equitable remedy. Accordingly, expanding the concept
of disgorgement to include specific restitution may often be
appropriate in actions brought by the Commission.'
The few district courts which have adopted an expanded
definition of disgorgement in fixing amounts to be disgorged fail
to provide sufficient legal analysis in support of their decisions
and essentially ignore judicial precedent. Only sufficient
judicial analysis can legitimately broaden the predominantinterpretation of disgorgement. A broad interpretation will
provide greater deterrence against fraud, promote investor
confidence and encourage brokerage firms and securities
professionals to more vigilantly guard against fraud or else risk
increased civil exposure. These results would be in. line with the
congressional intent to remove fraud from the securities industry
and increase the efficiency of our capital markets.
II. DISGORGEMENT AND THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT REMEDIES
AND PENNY STOCK REFORM ACT OF 1990
In passing recent legislation, Congress was sensitive to the
perceived deficiencies of the existing securities laws. On October
15, 1990, President Bush signed the Securities Enforcement Remedies
and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990.' One of the most significant
aspects of the new law is the provision for civil penalties. Prior
to its enactment, the Committee on Energy and Commerce explained
that monetary penalties are necessary, in part, to provide
increased deterrence against future securities laws violations and
to provide the courts and the Commission with increased flexibility
to appropriately redress such violations.' The Committee noted
that "(i]t is today almost inconceivable that Congress would
authorize a major administrative regulatory program without
empowering the enforcing agency to impose civil monetary penalties
as a sanction. "8 Under the new Act, the Commission may request
that a district court impose monetary fines in addition to the
traditional requests for, among other remedies, injunctive relief
and disgorgement.
5. The nature of the insider trading cases have reinforced a limited
interpretation of disgorgement because they involve an impersonal market, wherein
the defrauded public and concomitant harm are not easily identified. Specific
restitution in these types of cases would be impracticable. Requiring one who
trades on inside information to give up illegal profits may be the only logical
remedy. In contrast, the stock manipulation cases often have defrauded investors
whose losses are readily identifiable. In these types of cases, specific
restitution is especially appropriate.
6. Pub. L. No.101-429, 104 stat. 931 (1990).
7. H.R. Rep. No. 101-616, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 1379-1387 (1990).
8. Id. at 15 (quoting Colin S. Diver, Report to the Administrative
Conference of the United States Concerning the Assessment and Mitigation of Civil
Money Penalties by Federal Administrative Agencies 1 (May 1979)).
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The new law recognizes the important role that disgorgement
plays in the regulatory scheme. Section l(c)(2)(B) of the act
states that the effective date for the amendments pertaining to
civil penalties, or civil fines, shall not be construed to preclude
the Commission from ordering a disgorgement or accounting under the
Act. The Act empowers the Commission to seek disgorgement in
administrative' and cease and desist proceedings." Each
section" includes a provision that the money penalties in civil
actions are not an exclusive remedy but "may be brought in addition
to any other action that the Commission or the Attorney General is
entitled to bring." "
While the Securities Enforcement Remedies Act is important
legislation which will promote, among other things, the efficient
allocation of capital resources, it is intended to complement,
rather than replace, the existing array of regulatory remedies.
The Act is not comprehensive partially because the ceiling for
civil fines is arbitrarily limited. Pursuant to the Act, a United
States district court may not impose a fine in excess of the
greater of $100,000 or the amount of pecuniary gain for each
violation of the anti-fraud provisions." In a classic
manipulation case, wherein millions of dollars are fraudulently
obtained from innocent investors, a fine in the amount of $100,000
or the actual pecuniary gain is insufficient. Under the Act,
investors' losses should be paramount although they are presently
ignored. A court should at least be able to fine a violator in the
amount of investors' losses or some multiple thereof. 4 Until this
arbitrary ceiling is removed, the remedy of disgorgement,
especially if it includes specific restitution, will remain an
important regulatory tool to discourage securities fraud.
9. Sec. 21B(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. sec. 78u-d (as
amended in 15 U.S.C. sec 78u-1 (1990)).
10. section 21C(e) of the Exchange Act, as amended.
11. Title I is "Amendments to the securities Act of 1933"; Title II is
"Amendments to the securities Exchange Act of 1934"; Title III is "Amendments to
the Investment Company Act of 1940"; and Title IV is "Amendments to the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940."
12. 15 U.s.c. s 78u(d)(3)(c)(iii) (1990).
13. compare the penalties authorized under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act
of 1984, recodified in section 21A of the Exchange Act with the enactment of the
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C.A. S 78u-1
(1988 and Supp. 1991), under which a court is authorized to impose civil
penalties upon the person who committed the violation in an amount up to "three
times the profit gained or loss avoided", and upon the controlling person in an
amount not to exceed $1,000,000 or "three times the profit gained or loss
avoided", whichever is greater.
14. See, e.g., supra note 13.
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III. DISGORGEMENT As A RETURN OF UNLAWFUL PROFITS
The term disgorgement first appeared in Dolgow v. Anderson.,15
more than 30 years after passage of the Exchange Act. The
plaintiffs in Dolgow alleged, among other things, that the
defendants manipulated the price of Monsanto Company common stock
by buying large blocks of Monsanto at unnecessarily high prices.
The court invited the Commission to submit an amicus curiae brief
discussing whether or not the case should be maintained as a class
action. In its brief, the Commission explained that the maintenance
of class actions would enable defrauded investors to become whole.
At that time, the Commission sought "to deprive violators of
illegal gains" only in "rare cases."'6 In such cases, the goal of
returning ill-gotten gains was premised on promoting a policy of
deterrence, rather than to compensate defrauded investors. As the
Commission stated in its amicus brief, "as a law enforcement agency
it is requesting disgorgement of profits illegally obtained,
because effective deterrence requires more than an injunction
limited to future violations." (Footnote originally
omitted) (Emphasis added).' The Commission argued that the class
action would "provide the most meaningful method" for investors to
reclaim their losses since disgorgement was not "designed to
provide compensation to injured investors" and since it was
unlikely that individual investors would file separate lawsuits for
relatively small losses.18 (emphasis omitted)
The Commission's interpretation of disgorgement, which was
then confined to a return of illegal profits, has, to date, been
followed by practically all courts. Had the Commission not defined
disgorgement in such a limited fashion, its argument in favor of
maintaining the class action would have been less persuasive. In
other words, if the Commission had urged a broad interpretation of
disgorgement (including specific restitution), then its argument in
favor of the class action would have been proportionately
diminished. Judicial precedent did not require the Commission to
urge a limited interpretation of disgorgement. Therefore, it is
possible that certain policy considerations, such as the role
played by private litigants in enforcing the federal securities
laws and the conservation of Commission resources, influenced the
Commission's position on disgorgement at the time of the Dolgow
15. 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
16. Id. at 483.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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decision.1 9 The Commission's limited approach may have contributed
to the narrow interpretation presently given by the courts.
The first reported decision where the Commission litigated the
issue of returning ill-gotten gains is Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co.20  In Texas Golf Sulphur Co. the defendants
unlawfully traded common stock of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company on
the basis of non-public information. On appeal, The Second Circuit
ordered the return of all profits derived before the date the
insider information became public. In doing so, the court held that
restitution was an appropriate remedy "to effectuate the purposes
of the (Exchange] Act" because it involved remedial relief rather
than penalty assessment.
The court linked restitution to the return of illegal profits,
which is the same definition that the Commission ascribed to
disgorgement in its amicus curiae brief submitted in the Dolgow
case. However, restitution is not so limited. Specific
restitution requires that both parties be placed in the status quo
as though the transaction never occurred .2  Restitution is not
necessarily confined to the return of illegal gains, but may
include other compensation such as damages."
In Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc." the
Second Circuit reaffirmed its position that securities law
violators must forfeit their ill-gotten proceeds. The defendants
had fraudulently represented that investors' monies would be
19. The commission's earliest requests for disgorgement entailed a novel
legal argument not previously considered by the courts. Although not
specifically authorized by statute, these decisions addressed the propriety of
remedies ancillary to those delineated in the statutes. See James R. Farrand,
Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1779 (1976);
George W. Dent, Jr., Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in
Federal Remedies, 67 MiNN. L. REV. 865 (1983).
The novelty of the Commission's legal argument may have contributed to a cautious
approach in not seeking more money than actually received by the defendants.
Other considerations may have included whether to expand the role of the
commission to act, in essence, as a public collection agency by seeking to make
investors whole. Faced with limited resources, the Commission has in the past
refused to assume such a role. see, e.g., Speech of then SEC Commissioner
Richard B. Smith at the Program of continuing Legal Education of the California
Bar, at Los Angeles, Jan. 12, 1968. "The commission attempts to avoid being a
collection agency for injured investors ..... .. (on file at the SEC library,
Washington, D.C.), quoted in Disgorgement in SEC Actions, supra note 2, at n.15.
20. 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.s. 1005 (1971).
21. 3 J. PomERoY, EQunT JuxxsPRTENcz S 910 at 578 (5th ed. 1941); See also,
Disgorgement in SEC Actions, supra note 2, at 651.
22. Comment, The Measure of Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement Actions Against
Inside Traders Under Rule 10b-5, 34 CAT.U. L.Rzv. 445, 446 (1985) (citing Basile
v United States, 38 A.2d 620 (D.C. 1944)).
23. 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
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returned if the offering failed to attract a minimum number of
investors. Although the offering failed to induce a sufficient
number of purchasers, the defendants failed to refund monies due
the investors. In furtherance of the objectives of the Exchange
Act, the Second Circuit relied upon its Texas Gulf Sulphur
decision to affirm the trial court's order requiring the defendants
to disgorge the monies that each received from the public
offering.24
The decisions limiting disgorgement to illegal profits are not
without exceptions. In two cases, disgorgement liability was
assessed on a joint and several basis which is an extension of
liability beyond profits actually received. In Sec. Exch. Comm'n
v. R.J. Allen & Assoc.25 the district court ordered that the
defendants be held jointly and severally liable for all proceeds
received from the defrauded investors. The court cited the Texas
Gulf Sulphur and Manor Nursing Centers decisions as precedent to
order disgorgement, but did not acknowledge the limitations on
disgorgement as elucidated in those decisions. The court
emphasized that "[t]he reparation of funds caused by the
defalcation and fraud of these defendants is required by natural
justice and is within the equity power of this court."26
Similarly, without adequate legal analysis, the court ordered
disgorgement, jointly and severally, of all proceeds received in
connection with the fraudulent transactions in Sec. Exch. Comm'n
v. Micro-Therapeutics, Inc." These cases represent an aberration
among the reported decisions between 1968, the date of the Dolgow
decision, and 1990.
Several years after its Manor Nursing Centers decision, the
Second Circuit extended the reach of disgorgement to include
24. Accord Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257, 260
(S.D. N.Y. 1971) ("[Enforcement of the securities laws includes] a basic policy
that those who have engaged in proscribed conduct surrender all profits flowing
therefrom."); see also, Haines v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 428 F.
Supp. 435, 441 (D. Md. 1977) ("Disgorgement is limited only to those who profit
by their wrongdoing and does not extend beyond that."); Sec. Exch. Comm,n v.
Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978); Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706,
713 (6th cir. 1985) ("The purpose of disgorgement is to force a 'defendant to
give up the amount by which he was unjustly enriched' rather than to compensate
the victims of fraud." (quoting, sec. Exch. comm'n v. Commonwealth chemical sec.,
Inc., 574 F.2d at 102)); Estate of Pidock v.Sunnyland Am. Inc., [1989-1990
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,703 at 93,734 (S.D. Ga. May 8,
1989) (citing with approval sec. Exch. Comm'n V. Blatt; Sec. Exch. Commn v.
Commonwealth chemical Sec. and Sec. Exch. Comm,n. v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.
(Defendants ordered to disgorge only the profits actually received).
25. 386 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
26. Id. at 880.
27. (1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 99,086 at 95,180 (S.D.
N.Y. February 4, 1983).
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"paper" profits,2 as well as profits actually received. In Sec.
Exch. Comm'n v. Shapiro" an early insider trading case, the court
ordered the defendant to disgorge all "paper" profits accumulated
as of the date that the inside information became public knowledge.
The defendant continued to hold his stock for a period after the
inside information became public and the stock declined in value."0
The trial court's order required disgorgement of monies never
realized by the defendant, which the defendant argued was.contrary
to law.31 The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's order and
held that to require disgorgement only of actual profits "would
emasculate the deterrent effect of Rule l0b-5.",
3
The court held similarly in Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v.
Commonwealth Chemical Sec., Inc.,31 a stock manipulation case.
The defendants challenged the order of disgorgement by arguing that
losses incurred after the Commission suspended trading in the
subject securities should have been subtracted from the court's
disgorgement order. The court, disagreeing, stated,
We see no reason why, in determining how much should be
disgorged in a case where defendants have manipulated
securities so as to mulct the public, the court must give
them credit for the fact that they had not succeeded in
unloading all their purchases at the time when the scheme
collapsed.34
Consequently, the Shapiro and Commonwealth Chemical Securities
decisions had the effect of extending the previously limited reach
of disgorgement. Although historically disgorgement was limited to
a return of illegal profits actually received, and the Commission
never sought anything more; these decisions extended the breadth of
disgorgement to include profits not realized by emphasizing the
public's interest in deterring securities fraud. This broadening
of disgorgement liability provides judicial precedent and reasoning
for additional disgorgement liability beyond profits actually
received. Accordingly, courts are not required to limit
disgorgement to monies actually received in order to further the
purposes of the securities laws.
28. A paper profit is "an unrealized profit on a security or other
investment still held. Paper profits became realized profits only when the
security or other investment is sold." WEST'S LAW Am) COMERCIAL DIcTIONAPY IN FIvE
LANGUAGES 247 (1st ed. 1985).
29. 494 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 1974).
30. Id. at 1309.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 574 F.2d 90 (2d cir. 1978).
34. Id. at 102.
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IV. LIMITATIONS ON DISGORGEMENT
Despite the fact that precedent exists to support the
broadening of disgorgement, the remedy does have certain
boundaries. The reported decisions. contain basically three
limitations to disgorgement orders. First, disgorgement cannot be
punitive in nature. Second, the amount of disgorgement must be
causally related to the securities law violation. Finally,
securities laws violators are entitled to offset their profits by
legitimate business expenses. However, in light of the recent
district court decisions discussed below, defendants soon may not
be entitled to any offsets, so long as the disgorgement calculation
is causally related to the misconduct.
The Manor Nursing Centers decision is the first reported case
to reverse an order of disgorgement. The trial court had ordered
the defendants to disgorge monies earned from investing the illegal
proceeds. The Second Circuit relied upon the language contained in
Texas Gulf Sulphur which states that the Commission may seek
disgorgement "so long as such relief is remedial relief and is not
a penalty assessment."v35  In Manor Nursing Centers, the Second
Circuit held that ordering a return of earned profits on the
illegal proceeds constitutes a penalty. Accordingly, the court
modified the district court's decision. Notwithstanding the
arguably additional deterrent provided by an order requiring
disgorgement of profits on illegal proceeds, it was a penalty
because those defendants who invested wisely would be treated more
harshly than defqndants who did not invest at all, or who lost the
illegal proceeds by making poor investments. This type of
disparate treatment, according to the Second Circuit, would
constitute an impermissible penalty.
This analysis is consistent with the Second Circuit's opinion
in Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Shapiro, wherein the defendant was
ordered to disgorge "paper" profits.3' According to the Second
Circuit, the wrongdoer gets to keep his earned secondary profits,
yet he will also be ordered to disgorge monies lost by investing
unwisely. Otherwise, "[t]o require disgorgement only of actual
profits in cases where the price of the stock subsequently fell
would create a heads-I-win-tails-you-lose opportunity for the
35. Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Manor Nursing Centers, 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir.
1972) (quoting Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308
(2d cir. 1971)).
36. But cf. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir.
1978) ("Any . . . sum [beyond actual profits] would constitute a penalty.")
However, in its earlier decision in the same case, the Fifth Circuit, citing sec.
and Exch. comm'n. v. Shapiro, acknowledged that disgorgement could encompass
"paper" profits. see Ellsworth, supra note 2, at 656, n.95.
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violator: he could keep subsequent profits but not suffer
subsequent losses. '
In ascertaining whether the respective disgorgement orders
constituted an impermissible penalty, the Shapiro and Manor Nursing
Centers decisions insisted that securities laws violators be
treated equally. The Second Circuit held that if such defendants
are treated the same, then the disgorgement order is not a penalty.
If defendants within the same class are treated differently, then
the disgorgement order will be considered a penalty.
This analysis was followed by the majority opinion in Sec. and
Exch. Comm'n v. MacDonald." Defendant MacDonald had bought and
sold securities on the basis of non-public information. The trial
court ordered MacDonald to surrender all profits resulting from his
transactions. However, the First Circuit ruled that he would only
be required to disgorge an amount based on the value of the
securities as of the date that the non-public information became
generally disseminated. In so holding, the court stated, "Granted
that it may add to the deterrent effect of the Act every time the
Commission conceives of a ground for assessing greater liability,
to charge one class of insiders more than others who had committed
precisely the same fraudulent act does not seem to us to meet any
definition of 'equitable."'
39
The MacDonald decision provides another, related analysis,
which is intertwined with the "equal treatment" requirement
announced in the Manor Nursing Centers decision. The disgorged
profits must be "causally related" to the wrongdoing.40  This is
an alternative basis upon which the First Circuit analyzed the
Shapiro and Manor Nursing Centers decisions. According to the
First Circuit, subsequent profits and losses by a securities law
violator are unrelated to the illegal conduct and should not be
included in a disgorgement order."
The above analyses are consistent with requiring securities
laws violators to disgorge all monies paid by investors. In the
classic stock manipulation case, requiring the defendant to
disgorge all monies fraudulently obtained from investors will not
lead to unequal treatment of wrongdoers. All of these monies are
obtained by fraudulent conduct, and therefore meet the test of
being "causally related." From a public policy perspective,
37. Shapiro, 494 F.2d at 1309.
38. 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983).
39. Id. at 54.
40. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 54. See also sec. and Exch. comm'n v. First City
Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[D]isgorgement need only be
a reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to the violation.").
41. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 47.
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forcing those who manipulate the prices of securities to make
specific restitution to defrauded investors will certainly add to
the deterrent effect of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities
laws, and would be consistent with the Congressional intent to
remove fraud from the securities industry and increase the
efficiency of our capital markets. Restitution is a proper
objective of the securities laws.42  "Compensatory awards are
'uniquely suited to redress or cancel unfairness and promote
investor confidence in securities transactions. ""43  Providing
restitution to investors who purchase manipulated securities will
promote integrity to the marketplace and therefore, improve the
efficiency of our capital markets.
Having concluded that public policy and the "equal treatment"
and "causal relationship" rationales would comport with full
restitution in the manipulation context, the remaining obstacle to
specific restitution is that historically securities laws violators
have been entitled to credit for legitimate business expenses."
The business deduction is premised on a limited interpretation of
disgorgement as a return of illegal profits. If one accepts the
proposition that disgorgement is not so limited, then the court
would be free to disregard the defendant's legitimate overhead and
other costs associated with the fraudulent transactions in
computing a reasonable disgorgement figure.4s  On the other hand,
equity may, on infrequent occasions, make business expenses an
appropriate deduction. Eliminating the routine entitlement of a
business deduction will certainly be fair to the defrauded
investors who should usually not be responsible for the costs
associated with the fraud, and it would effectuate the securities
laws remedial purposes.
Some defendants may argue that the defrauded investors
purchased and received a security, whose value should
correspondingly reduce any order of disgorgement. However, it is
42. See generally Sec. and Exch. Comm,n v. world Gambling Corp., 555 F.Supp.
930, 934 (S.D. N.Y. 1983) ("[W]hile disgorgement has been said to serve more
important interests than the compensation of investors, (citation omitted], that
principle is a far cry from the proposition that restitution is an improper
end. ").
43. Id., quoting James R. Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil
Enforcement Suits, 89 HARv. L. Rzv. 1779, 1803 (1976).
44. See World Gambling Corp. 555 F. Supp at 934; Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v.
Benson, 657 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. N.Y. 1987).
45. Compare Ellsworth, supra note 2, at 658, which concludes that business
expense set-offs are appropriate, quoting MICHAL ENRicH, Tim LAW OF PROxOTERS S 266 at
488 (1916) (". . . it would appear that the principles of equity ought to permit
the defendant to offset all of his expenditures against the gross proceeds he
received from the challenged transaction in computing his profit.").
However, this analysis fails to consider the difference between litigation
involving private litigants and litigation involving the commission, which is
charged with enforcing the public's interest.
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usually impracticable to ascribe a value to a manipulated security
when the defrauding broker-dealer dominates the market in the
subject security, and has assigned an artificially inflated price
to such security. "[W]here the nature of a wrong makes damage
calculations difficult . . . it is better to give the plaintiff a
windfall than to permit the wrongdoer to profit from his wrong. ,4'
Therefore, investors should generally b6 entitled to a return of
their entire investment in manipulated securities, unless the
wrongdoer can establish a legitimate value for the subject
security.
V. RECENT DECISIONS
Two recent cases, only one of which was litigated arguably
establish investors' losses, rather than profits actually received,
as a more appropriate basis upon which to calculate an order of
disgorgement. These new decisions represent an obvious departure
from the original Commission enforcement actions wherein
disgorgement was limited to a return of illegal profits.
In Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Thomas James Assoc., Inc.4" the
defendants, a brokerage firm and its two equal co-owners, conceded
that they had manipulated the prices of certain securities in
connection with four initial public offerings. The Commission
alleged that the gross receipts from the fraudulent public
offerings during the first three days of trading was $3 millibn.
The Commission had limited its request for disgorgement to that
time period. The court used $3 million dollars, which represented
the investors' funds, as the basis for its disgorgement
calculation. In so doing, the court felt bound only to
establishing a causal connection between the sum of disgorgement
and manipulative conduct. The court stated that it did not "find
much guidance . . . in cases stating that the amount to be
disgorged is the amount of illegal profits."48  Ruling that the
defendants were entitled to a set-off for fair business expenses41,
the court reduced the gross revenues by approximately 50 percent.50
After considering other equitable considerations, such as the
46. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 56. See also Ellsworth, supra note 2, at 654-5
("[A]s between the wrongdoing party and the innocent party, any unexpected gains
connected with the wrongful transaction ought to go to the latter.").
47. [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,307 at 96,432
(W.D.N.Y. May 25, 1990)
48. Id. at 96,436.
49. Id. at 96,435. These expenses included commissions, telephone charges,
underwriting expenses and a proportionate share of overhead.
50. The court's inclusion of a set-off for business expenses is questionable
because it did not feel bound to limit disgorgement to profits actually received.
See Eatzcu, supra note 45. Accordingly, the court was not theoretically bound to
deduct the business expenses. It appears that the set-off was a function of
competing equitable considerations, and therefore, perhaps appropriate. See
Thomas James Assoc., Inc., supra note 47, at 96,435.
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issuance of permanent injunctions and their effect on the
defendants' professional reputations, and the respective roles
played by each of the defendants in the manipulative scheme, the
court apportioned the disgorgement sum of $1.5 million unequally
among the defendants, without regard for the profits actually
received by each of them.
Similarly, the Commission did not limit its request for
disgorgement to profits actually received by the defendant in Sec.
and Exch. Comm'n v. Lewis.5 1  In this case, the defendant, a
securities broker and former manager of a registered broker-dealer,
agreed to disgorge $475,000, which was allegedly "partial
recompense for the effect on the market price" of the manipulated
security. 52
Both of these cases are significant because the courts ordered
disgorgement in amounts unrelated to profits actually received by
the defendants. Inasmuch as the bases of the disgorgement figures
were the amounts of monies paid by investors, these disgorgement
orders are more consistent with traditional notions of restitution
and recoupment than disgorgement as historically sought by the
Commission and ordered by the courts.53 This type of analysis will
provide a greater disincentive to violate the securities laws and
promote a sense of justice among aggrieved investors.
VI. CONCLUSION
Expanding disgorgement liability to include specific
restitution on a joint and several basis is likely to increase the
deterrent effect of the securities laws. If the laws are to deter
fraud, they should at least provide an economic disincentive to
manipulate the securities market. While the passage of the
Securities Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act is a step in this
direction, the Act will be better able to deter fraud when the
ceiling on civil fines is at least extended to include all of the
investors' losses.
An unarticulated basis for the recent trial court decisions
arguably extending disgorgement liability may be that further
effort by the Commission is necessary to curb fraud. Given the
wholesale fraud in the penny stock market54 , class actions may not
51. [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 195,393 at 96,939
(S.D.N.Y. August 6, 1990).
52. Id. at 96,939.
53. See Sec. and Exch. Commn V. R.J. Allen and Assoc., Inc., 386 F. Supp.
866, 880-881 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
54. In September 1989, the North American Securities Administrators
Association released a report, "The NASAA Report on Fraud and Abuse in the Penny
Stock Industry," which concluded, based on a 50-state survey, that, "[p]enny
stock swindles are now the No. 1 threat of fraud and abuse facing small investors
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be as effective as originally thought in making investors whole.
Almost thirty years ago, Professor Loss stated that, "[a]n even
more effective device than the class action would be direct
enforcement by the Commission of restitution to the victims of
violation of the statutes."s Perhaps Professor Loss' idea is one
whose time has come.
Increasing the scope of disgorgement is not without
consequences. The Commission's bargaining power with defendants
will be proportionately increased, which will certainly be opposed
by those who resist any expansion of Commission authority. In
addition, the Commission's budget may preclude the Commission from
assuming additional tasks for its enforcement activities without
detracting from resources allocated for other parts of the
enforcement program." Therefore, even if the Commission
determined to pursue specific restitution in manipulation cases, it
might not be able to do so without disturbing other parts of the
agency's agenda."5
This endeavor may in fact require the investment of additional
Commission resources. However, it would be difficult to argue that
it is not in keeping with the spirit of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, which was designed to "protect investors and the public
in the United States." According to the report, investors lose at least $2
billion each year as a result of manipulative schemes involving the low-priced
securities. Text of House Report Nos. 101-616 and 101-617, 101st cong., 2d
Sess., at 8, 10 (1990).
55. 3 Louis Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1824 (2d ed. 1961).
56. in 1989, Chairman Ruder, in Congressional testimony before a House
Appropriations subcommittee regarding the commission's 1990 budget, stated that
... the agency has difficulty meeting its market oversight responsibilities
as a result of limited resources and a thinly-stretched staff." Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) No. 1329, pt. 2, at 4 (March 13, 1989).
57. Prompted by testimony that the commission lacked sufficient resources
to fulfill its statutory mandate, congress directed the commission to study the
possibility of the Commission becoming a self-funded agency.' Self-Funding study,
prepared by the office of the Executive Director of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission at iv (December 20, 1988). In response, on January 17, 1989,
the Commission submitted materials and proposed legislation recommending, among
other things, the establishment of a permanent revolving fund to be known as the
Securities Exchange Revolving Fund, to be maintained by fees collected by the
Commission, and which would enable the commission to increase its overall
effectiveness in regulating capital markets.
On May 2, 1991, Chairman Breeden testified before the House Energy and
commerce Telecommunications and Finance subcommittee on self-funding. chairman
Breeden urged subcommittee members to approve a self-funding mechanism and lift
current pay caps for senior Commission staff. According to chairman Breeden,
lifting pay ceilings results in lower turnover rates. 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 18, at 669 (May 3, 1991).
EXPANDING DISGORGEMENT
interest" and provided disciplinary powers by the imposition of any
"fitting sanction."58
Until now, many investors have lost their investments due to
stock manipulation. Even if the Commission brings an enforcement
action, the individual investors do not usually benefit from a
disgorgement order. Broadening the mainstream interpretation of
disgorgement to include specific restitution will promote investor
confidence, a vital objective of the Commission's agenda."
Expansion of the remedy of disgorgement will serve to deterrent
purposes in furtherance of the objectives of the Securities
Exchange Act and Congress. 0  Less fraudulent activity not only
reduces waste of capital, it redirects limited capital resources to
more efficient uses, providing a synergy which benefits the
national economy. Increased investor confidence and more efficient
capital markets are laudable objectives that should not be stymied
by an unduly limited interpretation of disgorgement.
58. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, S 6(b)(5-6), 15 U.S.C.A. S 78(f) (1988
and Supp. 1990) (empowering the commission to regulate the national securities
exchanges to protect investors and the public interest, by prescribing rules that
are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts).
59. speaking at the American stock Exchange conference last October,
chairman Breeden stated that, "the most important element in increasing the
supply of equity capital is maintaining and improving public confidence in the
U.S. markets. Individual and institutional investors, domestic and foreign, will
not invest in U.S. markets unless they are confident that they can do so without
becoming a victim of fraud or other abusive market practices." Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) No. 1418, pt. 2, at 2-3 (October 23, 1990).
60. sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. World Gambling Corp., 555 F. Supp. 930, 934
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).

